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The Autobiography of John Boyd

As far as we know, Boyd never wrote his life story or left any autobiographical notes. However, in 1977, about 18 months after he retired, he sat down for a long interview for the Air Force’s Corona Ace program.

Robert Coram included a lot of this material in his book, Boyd, the Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, for which this interview is one of the sources. I think you’ll find it interesting, though, to read what Boyd said about his life in his own words, and you’ll pick up details that Coram didn’t have space to include in his book.

Although the document doesn’t provide any information about the interviewer, Lt Col John N. Dick, Jr., it’s clear from early on that Colonel Dick is also a fighter pilot, so the back-and-forth between these two guys is fascinating, and illuminating, in its own right.

Download The USAF Oral History Interview of Colonel John R. Boyd (5.8 MB PDF)

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I visit Austria

Hallstatt

I’d love to, again, but this time it was Austrian economics.

I know very little about Austrian economics, or economics in general, for that matter. Boyd majored in the subject for his undergraduate degree at Iowa (1951), and perhaps you can detect an economic underpinning in his discussions of Soviet revolutionary strategy (Patterns 67-68) and guerrilla warfare (Patterns 90 – 98 and 107 – 109).

It’s also worth noting that he did have at least one book on Austrian economics in his collection:

F.A. Hayek; The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, edited by W.W. Bartley III, University of Chicago Press, 1988 annotated

“Annotated” means that he scribbled in the margins and probably on the front and back pages.

With all that in mind, Hunter Hastings, whose LinkedIn description is “Value creation processes built on the principles of Austrian economics,” just published a podcast of our discussion on Boyd and entrepreneurship on his Value Creators Podcast:

As I mentioned in my last post, Hunter and Mark McGrath have written a paper on the many common points between Austrian economics and Boyd’s strategy.

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Actions of Individuals: Boyd and Austrian Economics

Wikipedia defines “Austrian economics” this way:

The Austrian School is a heterodox school of economic thought that advocates strict adherence to methodological individualism, the concept that social phenomena result primarily from the motivations and actions of individuals and their self interest. Austrian school theorists hold that economic theory should be exclusively derived from basic principles of human action

In his first (and as far as I know, only) paper, “Destruction and Creation,” Boyd observed that:

Studies of human behavior reveal that the actions we undertake as individuals are closely related to survival, more importantly, survival on our own terms. Naturally, such a notion implies that we should be able to act relatively free or independent of any debilitating external influences—otherwise that very survival might be in jeopardy. In viewing the instinct for survival in this manner we imply that a basic aim or goal, as individuals, is to improve our capacity for independent action.

So, as you can see, there is potential for considerable overlap between the two philosophies.

In a recent paper, “Orientation: Bridging the Gap in the Austrian Theory of Entrepreneurship,”
Hunter Hastings and Mark McGrath point out some of these. Let me give you one example:

The paper introduces the concept of orientation as the source of entrepreneurial judgement. Orientation shapes observation and precedes decision-making and action. Orientation is the locus of human preferences and biases; it is the origination source of hypotheses; it is where human cognition resides. It is the source of “human thinking, perceiving and knowing”, and of “a person’s conscious adjustment to the state of the universe that determines his life.” Decisions and action flow from orientation. We trace the pathway to the concept of orientation that is well-established in the writings of Ludwig van Mises and many more Austrian school economists

This is a significant paper, and I recommend it highly. In my next post, I’ll report on a podcast that Hunter and I just made. In the meantime, you might check out Mark’s conversation with me on his “No way out” podcast.

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Faded glory

Spring is starting in South Carolina’s Lowcountry.

One of the first signs of Spring down here: This old redbud greets visitors to our community.

Every year, though, it puts out fewer blossoms and plays host to more of the ghostly Spanish moss.

I know how it feels.

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Boyd and Bolo

January 2 was the 57th anniversary of Operation Bolo, Col Robin Olds’ bold plan to ambush North Vietnamese MiG-21s. Briefly, USAF F-4 Phantom IIs shot down 7 MiG-21s with no losses of their own. Wikipedia has an extensive article on Bolo.

Air Force Col. Robin Olds in Southeast Asia – 1967- commander of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing. (U.S. Air Force Photo)

So the question arises: Did John Boyd know Robin Olds? Robert Coram mentions Col Olds one time, on page 213 of his bio of Boyd, calling him “legendary,” but doesn’t mention any meetings between them. A potential common thread was Capt Everett “Razz” Raspberry, who had been a student of Boyd’s at the Fighter Weapons School and was Col Chappie James’s wingman on Operation Bolo. Coram details how Razz used the tactics and techniques he learned from Boyd at FWS to great effect in Bolo.

I asked Chuck Spinney, who referred the question to Ray Leopold. Here’s Ray’s answer:

While there’s little doubt in my mind that John Boyd and Robin Olds at least knew of each other, I don’t think they ever collaborated on anything. Bear in mind that Olds, already a triple-Ace, came out of WWII as an Army Air Corps Major, while Boyd was just joining the Army as an enlisted guy destined for our occupation force in Japan.

I had to look this up, but Olds was a Lieutenant Colonel in ’51 and a full Colonel in ’53. He was already a living legend, married to a Hollywood star, and never any indication that Boyd and Olds had ever flown anywhere near one another. Had anything significant happened between the two of them, we would have heard about it, and I never heard anything.

I do recall Boyd making some passing references in small talk about Olds when Olds was in the news for some reason, but nothing of any significance.

I was also there with Boyd the first time (and then every other time) that he visited the AF Academy, and during that first visit he made a point of scheduling an appointment with the Commandant of Cadets (Hoyt S. (Sandy) Vandenberg, Jr., the son of the former AF Chief of Staff, who was the second Commandant of the AF Academy after Robin Olds). I sat with the two of them for about an hour as they talked, and I don’t recall Robin Olds’s name coming up during that conversation.

Regarding Bolo, Boyd respected what Olds, Razz and the others had accomplished, and I think he also had a sense of pride in having briefed so many SEA pilots on his EM work and how they would have the best advantage over their enemy aircraft. I don’t recall Boyd ever mentioning that he had briefed Olds, but he may have. And, I would imagine that if he hadn’t briefed him that Olds was sufficiently interested to have gotten the most pertinent information from either Razz or someone else.

As such, IMHO, Robert’s treatment of this topic, or non-topic, in his book is on target (with his absence of anything significant).

Incidentally, Boyd was already at the Pentagon at the time of Operation Bolo. Coram included Dr. Leopold among Boyd’s acolytes and provided a brief description of his career after the Air Force (p. 441). Perhaps he is best known for being one of the primary creators of the Iridium system, which is still going strong to this very day.

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Perils of locked konseptsia

Fascinating new column by Martin van Creveld: ”Konseptsia.”

As he defines it: “a Hebrew word we Israelis often use. It means, roughly, a system of interlocking ideas (sometimes known, in English, as “parameters”) that, taken together, form a framework for thought.”

Readers of this blog will immediately shout “orientation!” and as far as I can tell, you’d be right. I’ll leave it to Martin to illuminate any differences between the concepts.

Details aside, however, Martin’s column is all about locked konseptsia, and he gives three examples: The 1967 War, the 1973 War and the present situation in the Gaza Strip. For each of these, he shows how locked orientation led to disastrous consequences (subsequent heroic efforts to overcome the resulting debacles not withstanding).

So, for example, concerning the events of mid-1967:

As Israel watched, the konseptsia, which said that another war any time soon was highly unlikely, collapsed, triggering a crisis in the government and near panic among the population. In the end it was only by means of a full-scale Israeli offensive against its neighbors that the situation was saved.

I strongly recommend you read the entire post. Martin van Creveld is one of the world’s most astute military historians and was a significant influence on John Boyd. Here are a couple of charts from Organic Design for Command and Control (all of Boyd’s briefings are available for free download from our Articles page)

and

This notion, of a “directed telescope,” by the way, is very deep and will repay a lot of pondering. I would go so far as to claim (Don Vandergriff — feel free to jump in here) that it is required for mission command to work. To see why this might be, recall that Boyd suggested substituting “Leadership and Appreciation” for “Command and Control,” and here’s his definition of “appreciation”:

Appreciation, as part of leadership, must provide assessment of what is being done in a clear unambiguous way. In this sense, appreciation must not interact nor interfere with system but must discern (not shape) the character/nature of what is being done or about to be done;

Organic Design 34

John Boyd knew Martin van Creveld and recommended his works highly. Perhaps his favorite was Fighting Power (1982) (Expensive, true, but in my view essential to understanding military conflict, including the events of the present day). 

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Boyd in Korean

Robert Coram’s Boyd, The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, has just been translated into Korean.

It is fitting. As Coram recounted, 1st Lt John Boyd arrived in Korea on March 27, 1953, and on June 30, “Boyd was officially credited with damaging a MiG-15.” It happened on an illegal sortie across the Yalu River, where he was flying wingman for a Royal Air Force exchange officer. It was his only direct combat engagement. Hostilities ended on July 27, before he would have been promoted to element leader and become a “shooter” in his own right. You can read the details beginning on page 49 of the English edition of Boyd.

Through the good offices of Google Translate, I have confirmed that the language is Korean and that the text is indeed Coram’s Boyd (and not, say, Lady Chatterly’s Lover.)

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What would Boyd say???

You will remember Colonel Mike Wyly, USMC, ret., from Robert Coram’s book.  I think Robert would agree with me that Mike was much more than an acolyte and was in many ways a peer of John’s.

They were both, for example, colonels when they met. John had years of experience developing and teaching air-air tactics, and Mike had commanded infantry units in combat (Jim Webb, future Secretary of the Navy and U.S. Senator, was one of his platoon leaders).  John had spent a decade researching the basis for what became maneuver warfare, while Mike had written a masters thesis on a related topic and published extensively in the Marine Corps Gazette.

A few days ago, a mutual colleague asked Mike to comment on what Boyd would say about the situation in Israel and Gaza.  Here’s what he wrote:

For the record – here’s MY answer to the question:  “What would Boyd say?”

1. No difference: 

  • Speed – a prompt and speedy OODA when it comes to orienting yourself based on observations, making firm decisions, and turning your decisions into actions.
  • Pit your strengths against enemy weak points.
  • Make multiple thrusts at once into enemy vulnerabilities and into avenues of approach. 
  • Make it look like you are going to do one thing but do something else.
  • Maintain a solid focus of effort (i.e. Schwerpunkt).
  • Be bold.
  • Know when not to obey orders and take the action that will best exploit enemy vulnerabilities.

2. War is a “mind-game”, whether it’s heavy force against heavy, light vs. light, light vs.heavy, or heavy vs. light.

3. It’s not the size of the force that counts. It’s how you employ it. For instance, send me into the jungle to drive a big force that out-numbers me crazy. Or, give me a huge force to concentrate on my outnumbered enemy’s life-blood and I will wipe him out.

Boyd and I used to have these discussions, on and on. Boyd would give me an air-to-air scenario and I’d think it through and reply: “It’s the same on the ground…just terrain features instead of cloud cover, or mountains, etc.

Then I’d pose to him a scenario I had experienced as a rifle company commander in Vietnam. He’d think of a similar situation air-to-air.

In other words, have a fast OODA, moral resolve, and due caution when caution is called for.

I miss him. And the long talks we’d have. Often when the phone would ring in the night and wake me up to that machine-gun voice: “Hey, Mike, I’ve been thinking …

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Confusion and disorder

Even if you’ve seen this, it’s well worth a second look.

Even if you know what the OODA loop is — especially if you know what the “loop” is — watch this video. Chuck was present at the creation, and he’s passing along nearly 50 years of experience with Boyd’s concepts.

For example, Boyd says that in a conflict, the key to success is the ability to build and effectively employ snowmobiles. Why? Which snowmobiles? How do we use them? Chuck will give you some insight.

Chuck embeds the “loop” into the entirety of Boyd’s work. As Frans Osinga points out in Science, Strategy, and War, although the OODA Loop is the best known part of Boyd’s writings, in many cases, the only known, it is not the only or perhaps even the most important.

Enjoy.

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Where are we going? (and a stab at a fix)

Whisky Tango Foxtrot

by Xenophon

[SEoN Editor’s note: The following is an opinion piece that addresses, to use Boyd’s framework, grand strategy, whose purposes, as suggested on Slide 139 of Patterns of Conflict (available for free download from our Articles page), include:

  • Support national goal;
  • Pump up our resolve, drain away adversary resolve, and attract the uncommitted;
  • End conflict on favorable terms;
  • Ensure that conflict and peace terms do not provide seeds for (unfavorable) future conflict.

As with all guest posts on this site, the opinions expressed are purely those of the author.]

We have a problem

I have a few questions:

  • Why is the United States committing industrial suicide?
  • Why are we not looking at and analyzing the economic models from our global competitors and responding with adjustments of our own to establish counter measures to make us more competitive?
  • Why is our government so addled when it comes to the establishment of industrial and other strategic policies?
  • Why do we continue to pursue a policy of industrial colonialism and chase the cheap labor dollar around the world to the detriment of our own working class?

Continue reading →