military

by

John, Pierre, and Harry

Many years ago, large corporations published well written, well edited, and often lavishly produced magazines that showcased their products and, inter alia, demonstrated their enormous resources and competence.

First flight, however inadvertent, of the YF-16, January 20, 1974. US Air Force photo

In 1991, one of these, General Dynamics’ Code One, published a wide ranging interview with Harry Hillaker, the chief designer of the F-16. It is a tour de force. Hillaker was there at the very beginnings of the effort to develop a new fighter optimized for close-in air-to-air combat. At the time, the Air Force was deep into bringing the F-15 into production. As Hillaker describes it, the F-15 was a continuation of the standard fighter lineage: You want to go faster? Add another engine. You want to go farther? Make it bigger to carry more fuel. Being larger also meant it had more capacity to carry weapons and electronics, particularly the ability to employ radar-guided missiles, which could operate well beyond the visual rage of the pilot.

The result was an airplane that, while demonstrating significant air-to-air performance improvements over its predecessor, the McDonnell Douglas F-4, was correspondingly more expensive. Many at the time also felt it would be more difficult to maintain, particularly under wartime conditions. Incidentally, John Boyd was heavily involved in the F-X program of the late 1960s, which became the F-15.*

Hillaker recalls how a small group of pilots, analysts, and engineers — the “Fighter Mafia” — adopted a completely different philosophy: Employ advanced technologies, particularly fly-by-wire flight control systems and designed-in instability, to develop a fighter that was much smaller than the F-15 while optimized for the type of close-in dogfighting that characterized air battles during the Vietnam War. At first, this group consisted only of Hillaker, Pierre Sprey, and Boyd.

To see how this all came together to produce the F-16, read the article.

Biographical note: At the time, I was a staffer in the TACAIR shop of an obscure branch of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, the much subdued descendent of McNamara’s “whiz kids.” As the point of contact in our office for the Lightweight Fighter program, which included both the YF-16 and the Northrop YF-17, I probably met Harry Hillaker, although I truly don’t remember.

Lockheed Martin continued publishing Code One until 2016. They still maintain the archive and publish a newsletter, Vector Star.

*Robert Coram describes Boyd’s role in the F-X/F-15 in his bio, Boyd: The FighterPilot Who Changed the Art of War, chapter 15.

by

Auftragstaktik for Whole Foods

“The feedback I’ve gotten from team members and employees is that ultimately, we’re wasting time,” (Whole Foods CEO Jason) Buechel said. “It’s taking too long for decisions and approvals to take place, and it’s actually holding back some of our initiatives.”

As quoted in “Amazon’s Whole Foods boss slams ‘ridiculous’ bureaucracy in meeting,” by Eugene Kim in Business Insider, June 25, 2025

Balthasar van der Ast, Still Life with Basket of Fruit, 1622

Yay for Mr. Buechel. Eliminating unnecessary procedures is always a good idea. It’s the definition of “unneeded.” But I’ll give him an even better idea: Rather than fiddling with the existing approval and decision process, create systems and culture so that virtually no approvals — and many fewer decisions — are needed in the first place.

It can be done. Here’s the basic idea, courtesy of the late USAF Colonel John R. Boyd:

The German concept of mission can be thought of as a contract, hence an agreement, between superior and subordinate. The subordinate agrees to make his actions serve his superior’s intent in terms of what is to be accomplished, while the superior agrees to give his subordinate wide freedom to exercise his imagination and initiative in terms of how intent is to be realized.

As part of this concept, the subordinate is given the right to challenge or question the feasibility of mission if he feels his superior’s ideas on what can be achieved are not in accord with the existing situation or if he feels his superior has not given him adequate resources to carry it out. Likewise, the superior has every right to expect his subordinate to carry out the mission contract when agreement is reached on what can be achieved consistent with the existing situation and resources provided. Patterns of Conflict, 76

So once agreement has been reached, no further decisions or approvals are needed or expected. You have your mission and your resources, so just get on with it.

I’m sure by now that many of you have recognized the concept of auftragstaktik, an English word newly borrowed from the German word for “contract.”

How to do it? To get started I’d recommend any of the books by Don Vandergriff, particularly Adopting Mission Command, and Stephen Bungay’s The Art of Action. Both available from Amazon. Incidentally, “mission command” is a common English substitute for auftragstaktik.

While you’re at it, here’s a practice that will start paying benefits immediately:

One area Buechel is keeping a close eye on: the competition. He said he visits rival stores weekly to stay inspired and monitor industry shifts. “I am a grocery geek,” Buechel said. “I love going into our stores, but I love going into competition.”

This is an incredibly good idea. Boyd again:

Living systems are open systems; closed systems are non‑living systems. Point: If we don’t communicate with the outside world—to gain information for knowledge and understanding as well as matter and energy for sustenance—we die out to become a non‑discerning and uninteresting part of that world. Strategic Game, 21

There may be forces inside your organization that work against this seemingly obvious idea. Many organizations, for example, have picked up the insidious habit of using only their own products and services as some type of loyalty test. So employees of a particular car manufacturer only drive cars from that manufacturer. “Loyalty,” in other words, has closed their system. And think about it. Your least productive, least innovative, most disruptive and most toxic people often score extremely well on such loyalty tests.

I rant about this pathology in Certain to Win. Unlike other forms of sycophancy, it’s not hard to spot: Just go count cars in your parking lot.