I’m sorry, Mrs. Lind, there’s nothing more we can do.
Has the concept of fourth generation warfare outlived its usefulness? The term was coined by Bill Lind and his colleagues in a paper they published in the Marine Corps Gazette in October 1989, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.” If you haven’t read this paper, you might want to take the time now.
Here is their primary prediction:
Fourth is a goal of collapsing the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him. Targets will include such things as the population’s support for the war and the enemy’s culture. Correct identification of enemy strategic centers of gravity will be highly important.
In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between “civilian” and “military” may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). Success will depend heavily on effectiveness in joint operations as lines between responsibility and mission become very blurred. Again, all these elements are present in third generation warfare; fourth generation will merely accentuate them.
The first thing to note is that 4GW is an evolution from 3GW, which they equate to maneuver warfare and the blitzkrieg as defined in MCDP 1 and Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict. These are styles of warfare conducted by state armies against other state armies, although the paper does invoke the notion of transnational terrorists near the end.
At some point in the late 1990s, the theory bifurcated. Bill Lind and Martin van Creveld began to emphasize the decline of the state and focus on transnational guerrilla organizations like al-Qa’ida. Tom Barnett called this the “road warrior” model. T. X. Hammes, on the other hand, characterized 4GW as “evolved insurgency” and envisioned the techniques described in the paragraphs above as also useful for state-vs-state conflicts.
Lind and Hammes immediately got into a spat. This, from Lind’s critique of Hammes’ book:
However, there are also some key points where The Sling and the Stone misunderstands Fourth Generation war. One is found in the book’s assertion that 4GW is just insurgency. This is much too narrow a definition, and it risks misleading us if we take it to mean that we need only re-discover old counter-insurgency techniques in order to prevail against Fourth Generation opponents. At the core of 4GW is a crisis of legitimacy of the state, and counter-insurgency cannot address that crisis; indeed, when the counter-insurgency is led by foreign troops, it only makes the local state’s crisis of legitimacy worse.
Although they sometimes disagreed, the people who originated and developed the concept of 4GW understood the history of warfare. Bill Lind, for example, was a major player in the developer of 3GW/maneuver warfare and is recognized as such by the Marine Corps. T. X. Hammes laid out his arguments in his book, The Sling and the Stone, which lists some 14 pages of sources and references. Shortly after the book was published, he was awarded a Ph.D. by Oxford University, and he’s now at the Institute for International Strategic Studies of National Defense University. Van Creveld recently retired from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and has published more than 20 books, including his take on 4GW, The Transformation of War, also with 14 pages of sources. I’m highlighting credentials and sourcing to illustrate that these are serious works of scholarship, not thrown-together puff pieces. The theory of fourth generation warfare also spawned a cottage industry by lesser known writers, and I’ve archived numerous articles on the subject at http://dnipogo.org, (scroll down the right menu bar).
The 9/11 attacks, by a transnational guerrilla movement, seemed to confirm 4GW in both of its forms. In the last few years, however, everything has gone quiet. Transnational insurgencies, “global guerrillas” as John Robb terms them, have not become a significant factor in geopolitics. “Continuing irritation” might best describe them, whose primary function seems to be upholding national security budgets in frightened western democracies. The state system has not noticeably weakened. So it might be fair at this point to conclude that although 4GW was a legitimate theory, well supported by logic and data, the world simply didn’t develop along the lines it proposed.
A prominent critic of 4GW, Antulio J. Echevarria, may have been correct:
What we are really seeing in the war on terror, and the campaign in Iraq and elsewhere, is that the increased “dispersion and democratization of technology, information, and finance” brought about by globalization has given terrorist groups greater mobility and access worldwide. At this point, globalization seems to aid the nonstate actor more than the state, but states still play a central role in the support or defeat of terrorist groups or insurgencies.
Why? I’ll offer this hypothesis, that the primary reason warfare did not evolve a fourth generation is that it didn’t live long enough. The opening of Sir Rupert Smith’s 2005 treatise, The Utility of Force, states the case:
War no longer exists. Confrontation, combat, and conflict undoubtedly exist all round the world—most notably, but not only in Iraq, Afghanistan, the democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Palestinian Territories—and states still have armed forces that they use as a symbol of power. None the less, war as cognitively know to most non-combatants, war as a battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists.
The primary reason for this is that the trend which began with the introduction of firearms to the West in the 16th century, intensified with industrial revolution in the 19th, and culminated at Hiroshima in the 20th eliminated war as an option among advanced nations. The fall of the Soviet Union removed the rationale for large-scale proxy wars, and history came to an end (to coin a phrase).
What’s going to happen next? If I could make accurate predictions, I’d be tending to my castle in the south of France, but I’ll throw this out for discussion: Insurgency will return to the developed world. Thus, in the end, I’m siding with Hammes.
The conditions for insurgency, as described by Boyd in Patterns of Conflict, had been defused by reforms in the early 20th century. Within the last 25 years or so, these conditions have returned. The austerity measures in southern Europe, the decline in living standards and economic polarization in the United States, and the enormous increase in firepower available to the general citizenry (at least in the US) will combine to produce abrupt changes in political organization. So long as the democratic process remains uncorrupted, these changes will be largely peaceful. In non-democratic states, and in those democracies where the beneficiaries of highly-skewed income and wealth distributions attempt to hang on to their gains by whatever means they deem necessary, we should expect higher levels of violence.
What do you think?
Slightly East of New 
This is wonderful news! Does this mean we get Iraq back (and cheap access to their oil, those great bases with which to project power across the Middle East, and a loyal puppet regime)?
Does this imply success in Afghanistan, as DoD and its loyal minions have so long and often predicted? Good, since the almost-organic rejection we’re now experiencing is embarrassing (and worse for the Americans affected).
But the timing of this announcement seems a bit off. Whatever westerns in their suburbs thought about the nature and uses of 4GW, perhaps more important are the thoughts of those wielding it.
Based on the available information, one of Bin Laden’s goals was to destabilize the US political regime. Massive increase in military spending (using borrowed funds). The bill of rights being shredded (note yesterday’s House vote to tear another strip from the 4th amendment). Our Courts holding show trials of terrorists — recruited, financed, supported by our security services. Torture and concentration camps.
Bin Laden’s other goal, more clearly stated, was to incite a war between the USA and Islam. Perhaps as Bismarck used wars to unify small States to create Germany. The failed occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, the attacks on Pakistan, Yemen — now spreading into Africa. And now the reaction of the US people to the Boston Bombing. These suggest that if this was his intent, Bin Laden has succeeded beyond imagining.
Perhaps you prefer to give this mode of conflict another name, instead of “war” or “4GW”. Perhaps “Pooh”. Whatever the name, it seems to be working.
We — the Second American Republic — seem to be losing. And that’s the ultimate judge of effectiveness for any tool of political conflict.
Dear Fabius,
So your definition of “4GW” is “imperfections in the American system”? Imperfections in democracy? Human nature? Interesting concept of “war.”
By the way, how’s al-Qa’ida doing nowadays?
All the best,
Chet
(1) AQ is doing great, one of the top success stories of our time.
Not only is it the top brand name for iihadist or Islamic revolutionary movement around the world, but it appears to have encouraged many (thousands, millions?) to join Islamic movements. Makes the iPhone look like a flash in the pan by comparison.
Further, they’ve incited what might become a major conflict between the US and Islam (too early to say for sure) — a step on what appears to be their plan to revitalize Islam.
Why do you ask? Is all this not obvious? It’s even in the newspapers and (more importantly) every week’s show of NCIS and NCIS-LA — the real source of information for real Americans, in additional to the Washington Times & Fox News (although they’re all quite similar).
(2) 4gw = imperfections in the US State?
When I break a plate, I tell my wife it was the plate’s fault. Imperfections! Oddly, she tends to look at the actor and his methods (ie, my carelessness when washing dishes).
More specifically, 4GW is a tool to produce political change. You point to the changes that result and blame imperfections in the US State. Quite so. But I think those who exploited the imperfections will get some credit in the history books, and that the results validate the 4GW methods they used.
Dear Fabius,
Perhaps I wasn’t clear. I was referring to the organization known as “Al-Qa’ida,” not a brand name that could be assumed by anyone. According to your argument, the Nazis won WW II because there are skinheads in Germany today.
1. “4GW is a tool to produce political change.”
2. There is political change.
3. Therefore 4GW must be the cause.
QED.
Chet
Analogy: al Qaeda is to AQ “franchises” like Hitler’s NAZIs are to today’s skinheads.
The various AQ franchises are serious threats to several governments (larger reach than BL’s AQ ever achieved) , and in resources are probably far larger than BL’s AQ. So per your logic the skinheads are as large or larger threat to the West than Hitler’s military.
I stand defeated by your logic!
Trivia note: while the franchises are different than BL’s AQ, they are in many ways are its children. If for no other reason, US policy has erased the difference, to some degree. History might not even see the distinction.
“Trivia note: while the franchises are different than BL’s AQ,” Indeed they are. Except for the name, which might serve recruiting — or considering what happened to the real al-Qa’ida, it might not — they don’t appear to have much relationship to OBL.
As for being “threats to several governments,” these would be?
“So per your logic the skinheads are as large or larger threat to the West than Hitler’s military.” No, I’m afraid you’ve outsmarted yourself (again). This was your logic: Even though the real al-Qa’ida is gone, there are folks out there calling themselves al-Qa’ida, so al-Qa’ida is a threat to the West. Replace “al-Qa’ida” with “Nazi Party.”
Comparing franchises arising out of al-Qa’ida with Hitler’s NAZI Skinheads to each other is like comparing apples to oranges.
Skinheads represent the decentralized network of the Right, while al-Qa’ida franchises represent both the decentralized network of the Right in its use of cells, and the distributed network of the Left in Islam.
Of course I may be wrong. Maybe Christians structured as the Left, if radicalized, would naturally restructure themselves as Skinheads, but it seems like if there was much truth to that, the outcome of WWII, and much of history in general, would have been different.
And then again, I am not suggesting that Shia, when radicalized would necessarily join al-Qa’ida, I have no way of knowing if that is true or not. What I am suggesting is that al-Qa’ida could just as easily work within a distributed network as any member of a radicalized Islam, which Skinheads could not. Skinheads would be too easily observed.
May be the best way to explain my logic is this: al-Qa’ida seems to be mostly a command structure inside a distributed Islam, while Skinheads, although the last Pope was under radicalization by the NAZI culture as a youth, have no such comparable distributed network that I know of to work out of.
We have certainly demonstrated why the “study” of 4GW is dead. We cannot even agree upon the simple facts in the newspapers. I’ll take that one step more, speculatively: that’s one reason we’re losing. Our military controls the discussion not just by their massive resources (dwarfing even the State Dept, let alone non-governmental groups), but through their more unified perspective. They define the debate, on their terms — and so they win.
So, recognizing that this is a waste of time (pointless bickering in the peanut gallery), I’ll make a few trivial points.
“As for being “threats to several governments,” these would be?”
The US is in a tizzy from a few (mostly failed) jihadist (or perhaps jihadist) attacks. Consider the toll taken from AQ in Iraq: aprox 800 in Jan-March this year.
That’s roughly the equivalent to 8,000 in the US. 32,000 per year. I suspect if we were experiencing that, many Americans would consider this a serious threat (Chet might disagree, of course). Considering the policy measures taken since 9-11, and imagine what such a campaign might produce in the US. That’s what Iraq faces.
Another nation “threatened” by AQ is Yemen. That their government has called in US firepower indicates how serious they consider the threat. Chet might disagree with them, of course.
“So per your logic the skinheads are as large or larger threat to the West than Hitler’s military.” No, I’m afraid you’ve outsmarted yourself (again). This was your logic: Even though the real al-Qa’ida is gone, there are folks out there calling themselves al-Qa’ida, so al-Qa’ida is a threat to the West. Replace “al-Qa’ida” with “Nazi Party.”
I stand defeated. AQ is no big deal.
What to do today? I’ll see the results of the long Boston lock-down. I’ll contimplate the significance of another American arrested but denied his Miranda Right. This week I’ll watch the Senate vote on CISPA, ripping another strip from the 4th ammendment, because Americans see no threat from AQ (and jihadism for which it is the tip).
Aftewards I’ll tune in NCIS and NCIS-LA, and watch (along with tens of millions of fellow Americans) the doings of Arab terrorists (and watch them get gunned down by the good guys).
Move on. Nothing happening here.
BTW — Franco is still dead. Bin Laden is still dead, and still winning (by exploting our vulnerabilities, starting a conflict between America and Islam). But it’s not 4GW — its Pooh Conflict! QED.
I think you already mentioned that Franco is still dead.
We all agree that lots of stuff is going on that demonstrate the (possibly terminal) problems with the Second Republic. The question is whether 4GW theory has anything to offer. My answer is “No.” So far, other than restating the problems, I don’t see any cogent arguments to the contrary.
Yemen? The list of their problems is so long I hardly know where to begin: Unfinished business stemming from the forcible merger of North and South Yemen; tribal issues; virtually no economy; growing population; periodic border problems with Saudi Arabia and Oman, etc. Notice that I haven’t even gotten down to al-Qa’ida, yet. They do make a convenient scapegoat, of course.
Iraq? Are you serious?
Not every monster under your bed is al-Qa’ida, or 4GW.
By the way, for those of you are have not been paying attention: Franco is still dead and we’re still losing.
“None the less, war as cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as a battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists.”
True enough. Only I believe that all war is about economic considerations, and fought by people with little economic consideration. So as long as the structure to support war is still there, there will be war.
War is basically two or more structures pounding against each other, and while there are many cultures within these structures, there are basically two structure in the world.
The structure of the Right, which has a normalizing vertical force that controls the friction between the horizontal forces in the state (the structure of the USA) and you have the structure of the Left that doesn’t support friction within the state. A structure of the Left has both vertical and horizontal pushing and pulling each other in the direction of the resulting force.
Perhaps it could be said that Saddam had Iraq structured as the Right, and when we destroyed that structure the Lefties took over. If this actually happened, who would have guessed?
Of course within each state there are both Right and Left structures, but it is the cultures of insurgencies and incumbent forces that goes to war to determine how the state is structured. so, to say, “such war no longer exists”, doesn’t take into the fact that the structures for war still exists.
By “people with little economic considerations” I don’t mean that only the poor fight wars, although that is more true than not, but the reason they fight and are willing to die, has little to do with economic considerations. Of course that is really just my opinion, I might be wrong.
If I am right, then many join the professional military of the USA as a way into the middle class, but that is a strategy, not a reason. I think the real reason these “people with little economic considerations” join is because they are asked to join, either implicitly or explicitly, and make the judgement of joining on something more than economic considerations.
I think most join to support the structure(s) they observe.
I think we should call it Anti-Trust Warfare. As Boyd pointed out, destroying trust and increasing friction within an organization will destroy it. The people (os the USA) in general are losing trust in their Government. That often leads to Guerrilla Warfare (organized armed civilians) type attacks.
Having been through the one minute guerrilla warfare course what we are seeing is nothing but the time honored methods of Infiltration, Subversion and Sabotage.
I think that collateralized debt obligations, sub-prime mortgages, and credit default swaps were invented by al-Qa’ida.
Close…..I think it was 2003 or 2004 when the FBI report was warning of one of the most massive Organized Crime Financial attacks ever seen.
Yeah — who would have thought that after Tora Bora, OBL holed up on Wall St? Wonder when he moved to Abbottabad?
Do you remember that shortly after 9/11, there were reports of large shorts of American Airlines and United Airlines stock? I always thought these were just the usual crisis rumors.
“Having been through the one minute guerrilla warfare course what we are seeing is nothing but the time honored methods of Infiltration, Subversion and Sabotage.”
That sounds like a similar statement made by another very wise man, who called, and I am paraphrasing here, the insurgency in Iraq a bunch of dead-ender just hanging on. You should have stayed at least until the lunch was served.
Not even close. The wise man you speak of has no clue about Special Warfare IMO.
“The Great Deformation” (Stockman) talks about wallstreet having invented sub-prime loans … at least by the early 30s … and wallstreet was egregiously pushing them all over Europe (once US gov. got agreement that the wallstreet sub-prime loans had precedence over reparations … in fact, wallstreet was making subprime loans to countries for them to pay reparations).
“Invisible Armies” (Boot) has playing on public opinion in home country of invading army dating back to revolutionary war … where British public opinion played part bringing war to conclusion. loc1569-75:
If the Americans had been resisting the Roman Empire, there is little doubt that a fresh army would have been raised and George Washington and other leading insurgents would have been crucified. But such a response was unthinkable, given the state of British “public opinion”—a phrase that first saw print in Gibbon’s Decline and Fall, the first volume of which appeared, by a fateful coincidence, in 1776. This was a new and hugely important development in the long history of guerrilla warfare: a parliamentary government could not prosecute a war that did not enjoy popular backing. Insurgents’ ability to manipulate popular sentiment—to break the enemy’s will to resist—helped to offset some of the advantages enjoyed by an incumbent regime and gave them a greater chance of success.
… snip …
Counterfactual history could also have the French taking India while the British were bogged down trying to reconquer their former colonies. And the Romans knew when it was time to rationalize the borders of the empire.
The cost of shutting down a major city like Boston for a day, actually, the disruption,
lasted nearly a week.
http://www.marketplace.org/topics/economy/how-do-you-lock-down-city-boston-and-how-much-does-it-cost
Overtime costs for police, security, FBI, paramilitary, and full military and supporting
elements, are one thing.
We’re talking canceled classes at 3 major universities, effects at banks, insurance
companies, lost productivity, the list is endless.
For a county, which, oh by the way, in case you haven’t noticed, IS BANKRUPT.
“Being losers, not being able to settle themselves”*
* Uncle of the alleged perpetrators.
Max
I’ve recently read “Ike’s Bluff”, “The Great Deformation”, “Prophet’s of War”, and “Invisible Armies” … all describing MICC justifying a series of conflicts to boost quarterly profits (Spinney’s “Perpetual War” theme). “Prophet’s of War” (also) has MICC hitting on adding former Soviet block countries to NATO and they would require compatible weapons (as way of tiding over revenue after the fall of Soviet Union). It talks about deal with several of the countries that if they would cast their UN vote supporting Iraq invasion, they would be part of NATO expansion along with US foreign aid earmarked to buy US manufactured weapons. Also claims are that one of the reason that the Korean War didn’t last longer was that Eisenhower insisted on balanced budget (all spending limited to actual tax revenue) … and major problem with conflicts since then have been they are being paid for with borrowed money (with enormous amounts disappearing down the MICC hole).
This mentions 2007 surge to turn around Iraq War
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War_troop_surge_of_2007
but something of myth:
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/03/13/the-myth-of-the-surge/
A son-in-law did two tours in Iraq (also recently had grandson come back from tour in Afghanistan), 2004-2005 in Fellujah during some of the worst fighting (foot patrols and lots of fire fights). Second tour 2007-2008 in Baqubah … this references Baqubah as much worse than Fallujah
http://www.amazon.com/Battle-Baqubah-Killing-Our-ebook/dp/B007VBBS9I/
some more here
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/hunting-al-qaeda-part-i-of-iii.htm
this discusses Rumsfeld meeting with Saddam … and references that lot of what went on is still classified
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Iraq_War
and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_support_for_Iraq_during_the_Iran%E2%80%93Iraq_war
this has satellite imagery warning that Iraq was massing to invade Kuwait … but white house discrediting him saying Saddam wasn’t going to any such thing. however, when he warned that Saddam was massing to invade Saudia Arabia, it finally prompted white house to do something, leading to “desert storm” and Boyd’s involvement in the strategy
http://www.amazon.com/Long-Strange-Journey-Intelligence-ebook/dp/B004NNV5H2/
this mentions that part of the justification for (2nd) Iraq was that it would only cost $50B. Numbers being floated is that with long term costs, it may be more like $5T (a factor of 100 times more)
http://www.businessinsider.com/750-million-united-states-embassy-iraq-baghdad-2013-3
I think in the context you give to the question, “I’m sorry, Mrs. Lind, there’s nothing more we can do.” the answer to your question is yes, 4GW is dead. It is just as dead as 1GW, 2GW, 3GW, and Modern Warfare.
The king is dead, long live the king.
We are now at the place in time where, in the terms of warfare, it is more a matter of build, replace, and hold.
The world has so evolved, through the surrendering of sovereign rights by those of wealth, that fear, honor and interest are no longer relevant, except in isolated areas like the USA, Afghanistan, and Kurdistan.
Though sovereign ownership by multinational corporations, it has become a matter of a warring nation, or nations, to become builders of infrastructure; engage in the replacing of old forms of security; and then to hold these areas, of built infrastructure and replaced security, against local forces in the effort to extract resources for the victor(s).
I think we can call this generation of warfare Modern Warfare II.
You raise a good point Larry. Some good thinkers have argued for decades that national identities and boundaries are irrelevant, and it’s corporations that run the world. Yet for the average “schmuck” life continues, still in the shadow of nationalistic identity. In still other places that is supplanted by religion. While in still other places, nationalism is elevated to a sort of religion,
(not mentioning any names.)
I guess the author and readers of this article has (sic) failed to read the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) (Ikhwan) in America’s plan to destroy us on their march to form a global Caliphate. Have you ever read the Cairo Declaration? What do you think of CAIR, ISNA, MSA, IIIT and the 29 groups listed in their plan? What is the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)? I suggest you learn about the Muslim Brotherhood and how they have infiltrated our government, starting with the White House.
Neither the House nor the Senate will hold hearings on the Muslim Brotherhood and the plan they wrote. This is the blueprint for the Muslim Brotherhood in America, known as An Explanatory Memorandum: On the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America or, in America’s largest terrorist prosecution in US federal court, Government Exhibit 003-0085 3:04-CR-240-G in U.S. v Holy Land Foundation, et al. You can buy this online at Amazon for only $5.00 or you can read it at: The Oak Initiative website:
Click to access 15-Shariah-The-Threat-to-America-Team-B-Report-Web-285-308.pdf
Link here for a better explanation of the plan.
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2013/05/25/an-explanatory-memorandum-from-the-archives-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-in-america
The following Muslim Brotherhood document was entered into evidence in the U.S. v Holy Land Foundation trial, and is a primary source threat document that provides new insights into global jihad organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood. These documents (covered extensively in chapter four) define the structure and outline of domestic jihad threat entities, associated non-governmental organizations and potential terrorist or insurgent support systems. The Memorandum also describes aspects of the global jihad’s strategic information warfare campaign and indications of its structure, reach and activities. It met evidentiary standards to be admissible as evidence in a Federal Court of law.
In the original document, the first 16 pages are in the original Arabic and the second are English translations of the same. It is dated May 22, 1991 and titled “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America” (Memorandum). The document includes an Attachment 1 that contains “a list of our organizations and the organizations of our friends.”
The Memorandum expressly recognizes the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) as the controlling element of these organizations and expressly identifies the Muslim Brotherhood as the leadership element in implementing the strategic goals. The Memorandum is reproduced here in its official Federal Court translation, as Government Exhibit 003-0085 3:04-CR-240-G in U.S. v Holy Land Foundation, et al. with punctuation, line spacing and spelling intact.
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) claims they have influence in over 70 countries, including here in American. What you see happening in Egypt with Morsi, will come to America because their credo is all the same “Allah is our objective; the Quran is our law, the Prophet is our leader; Jihad is our way; and dying in the way of Allah is the highest of our aspirations.”
An Explanatory Memorandum: From the Archives of the Muslim Brotherhood in America: Here is a quote from the plan: “4- Understanding the role of the Muslim Brother in North America: The process of settlement is a “Civilization-Jihadist Process” with all the word means. The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying 282 the Western civilization from within and “sabotaging” its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions. Without this level of understanding, we are not up to this challenge and have not prepared ourselves for Jihad yet. It is a Muslim’s destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes, and there is no escape from that destiny except for those who chose to slack. But, would the slackers and the Mujahedeen be equal.”
Well Frank, I think it was Mao who said that revolution comes at the end of a bullet.
And the difference is that a bullet targets an individual, while 4GW targets Orientations, and uses words.
So until the U.S. SOF can’t hit a X on a map like they claim they can, I will not worry too much about the MB taking over the U.S.A.
In a way, there is no generational warfare, only those who fight that way, and the U.S. has decided on 2GW.