Agiity and deception

Fighting for Honor
The history of African martial arts traditions in the Atlantic world
by T.J. Desch Obi
University of South Carolina Press, 2008
346 pages, including 124 pages of notes and bibliography

Reviewed by Chet Richards

Kum yali, kum buba tambe! (He is tricky, so I will win by being tricky, too!)

As a southerner of European ancestry, I had long wondered how slave owners kept control over their victims. On many plantations, slaves vastly outnumbered owners and overseers, and because of the hard nature of their work, many slaves were in much better physical conditions than their owners. Why didn’t the slaves revolt or simply leave?

It turns out that many did. Most Americans are familiar with the Underground Railroad and may even recall the Nat Turner Rebellion (1831), the Fugitive Slave Acts (1793 and 1850) and the Dred Scott Decision (1857). But there are a couple of other ways slaves used to preserve their honor and sometimes even their freedom. One of these was “maroonage,” where they would abandon their plantations and settle in the swamps, rugged hills and dense forests of the South. It has been estimated, for example, that the Great Dismal Swamp of southeastern Virginia and northeastern North Carolina may have harbored maroon communities totaling perhaps 2,000 escaped slaves.

The other was simply to resist. As T. J. Obi meticulously documents in this study, Africans and their descendents brought with them an arsenal of well developed martial arts styles. These provided the basis for preserving honor withing the slave communities and even, on occasion, to resist vicious beatings by overseers.

There were two keys to making this work: deception, because an unarmed defender had to close with his attacker, and agility, to avoid weapons and complete the attack. Obi includes these under the label “tricknology.”

When fighting a white oppressor, the ideal was to strike a butting-style head blow and finish the fight before it even developed. … As such butts had to be delivered at close range to be effective, a fighter had to use trickery to close the distance under some innocuous disguise.  (p. 109)

Readers familiar with Boyd will immediately recognize the concept of “operating inside the OODA loop.”

The book itself is quite academic and heavily footnoted, reflecting its origins in doctoral research. That said, however, it’s not a heavy read and is packed with interesting tidbits. Did you know that maroon communities survive to this day in the mountains of Jamaica, where they won their freedom by successful resistance some 50 years before the official abolition of slavery in that colony? And slave societies developed all manner of methods to conceal their existence from their owners. In one area, for example, the message “weevils in the wheat” meant that overseers had discovered that a meeting was planned and so it was being postponed.

Perhaps the most fascinating conclusion of the book is that African martial arts techniques still survive in the Americas. Perhaps the best known example is the Brazilian capoiera, but Dr. Obi’s research on site in the low country of the Carolinas documents their existence in the Gullah communities and their descendents into the 21st century.

[You want agility? Check out this YouTube video of a capoiera demo. The kicks and sweeps from inverted positions are typical of Angolan fighting styles.]

Real OODA loops and IWCKI

New in our Articles section (see menu bar above):

Boyd’s Real OODA Loop.  I’ve been working on this thing for about a year now, and I think it finally meets the definition of a masterpiece: not finished, just abandoned. The original purpose was to point out that the most popular version of the OODA loop–observe, then orient, then decide, then act–is not wrong but is incomplete. It is, in fact, a subset of the complete “loop” that Boyd drew in “The Essence of Winning and Losing” (also available in Articles) that accounts for the generation of novelty and is a key mechanism in keeping the orientation process humming along smoothly. It is not, however, particularly useful for initiating actions in the heat of battle.

If We Can Keep It. The folks at the Center for Defense Information have kindly assented to my posting the pdf of IWCKI. Published in January 2008, it was the latest in the trilogy that began with A Swift, Elusive Sword. I tried to push the envelope with this one, but I’m afraid that time has pulled it into the mainstream (see, for example, “The Top 10 Lessons of the Iraq War,” by Stephen M. Walt in Foreign Policy).  I mean, even Newt is saying things like “We need to understand that our being in the middle of countries like Afghanistan is probably counterproductive.”

Thinking Like Marines

Mike Wyly’s classic article, Thinking Like Marines, on applying the concepts of maneuver warfare to business, is now available here on Fast Transients (it was one of the first pieces I posted on belisarius.com in about 1999).

Contains this classic line, which resonates with successful leaders in any field:

I should interject here that control is not what maneuver warfare is about. In fact it is not what warfare is about. As a commander in Vietnam I wanted to unleash my marines on the enemy, not control them.

It will be available through the “Articles” button on the menu bar.

 

God bless the USMC

As my wife and I were walking into the commissary at Parris Island this morning, just ahead of us was a Marine master sergeant — a DI, a Hat.  From the look on his face, he didn’t much care whether he went in through the door or the wall.

Just for a second, my blood froze.  Primal memories of military training long ago.  Then I told myself:  Get a grip!  You’re retired.  You’re Air Force.  You’re a colonel, fer crissakes!!  It seemed to help.

Sure glad he’s on our side.

Criteria of a Sensible Grand Strategy

Chuck Spinney

Reposted with permission from: http://chuckspinney.blogspot.com/p/criteria-of-sensible-grand-strategy.html


The Bush administration’s theory and practice of grand strategy could be summarized in the sound byte, “You are either with us or against us.” But the art of grand strategy is far more subtle than this, and it is now clear that Bush’s primitive conception led to all sorts of problems at home and abroad. Continue reading

Qadhaafi tries agility

Straightforward example of agility in the military — simple but effective.  Having adopted their opponents’ tactics, their superior (but still limited) training and cohesion are giving them an edge.

One of Boyd’s favorite sayings was that you don’t have to be perfect, only better than your opponents.

Another was “People, ideas, and hardware … in that order!”  Just a few days ago,   pundits were predicting that with the intervention of coalition airpower, the rebels would quickly resume their westward march and take Tripoli.

They may still do that, but it’s now going to take a focus on the people and ideas part. I wouldn’t be surprised if the coalition has special operations forces on the ground, and the primary mission of such units is to train local forces (not to conduct covert operations themselves, although they are certainly capable of that).  For more information on US Special Forces and their use in assisting insurgencies, see Pat Lang’s blog, Sic Semper Tyrannis, particularly here and here.

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Libya crisis: Gaddafi forces adopt rebel tactics

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12911904

Ras Lanuf has now changed hands for the fourth time in three weeks. BBC world affairs editor John Simpson in Tripoli has been assessing the fighting.

Colonel Gaddafi’s forces have changed their tactics.